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Introduction 
 
 
Change of Government in Georgia 
New Emphases in Domestic and Foreign Policy 
Sabine Fischer and Uwe Halbach 
In autumn 2012, Georgia underwent a development that is already being described as 
historical. Following an emotional and at times hostile election contest, the Georgian 
parliamentary elections on 1 October led to a change of government, which the country 
is hailing as proof of its democratic maturity. President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United 
National Movement party, which had been in power for the last nine years and held a 
two-thirds majority in the last parliament, suffered a clear defeat against a coalition of 
six opposition parties, none of whom had been represented in the previous parliament. 
 
Saakashvili will remain in office until 2013. What course will the new coalition govern-
ment under Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili now set in domestic and foreign policy? 
Will the incumbent president, who is endowed with a wide range of powers, and the 
new government be able to work together in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elec-
tions or will they become entrenched in bitter rivalry? 
If the opposing political camps led by 
President Saakashvili and Prime Minister 
Ivanishvili succeed in working together 
peacefully up until the presidential elec-
tions (due to be held in October 2013), this 
change of government could justifiably be 
considered exceptional. Around 120 par-
liamentary and presidential elections 
have been held in the former Soviet Union 
region (excluding the Baltic republics) since 
1991. They have usually resulted in the 
re-election of the ruling government and 
many have been clouded by suspicions of 
fraud. A peaceful change of government 
by means of an election process remains 
the exception. In Georgia, this is the first 
change that has not been brought about by 
a coup d’etat. 
Before the elections, voices warning of a 
polarisation of society were getting louder 
both in Georgia and abroad. The country’s 
highest moral authority, the head of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II appealed 
for maintaining peace. The West also fol-
lowed the elections with concern. The gov-
ernment vilified the opposition as a politi-
cal force wanting to take Georgia back into 
the past and into Russia’s political orbit. 
The opposition labelled the incumbents 
“fascists”. From October 2011 (when multi-
billionaire Ivanishvili entered politics) to 
August 2012, Transparency International 
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Georgia documented cases of intimidation 
of opposition activists, political arrests, 
unequal treatment of government and 
opposition parties with regard to illegal 
party financing, and prevention of oppo-
sition party activities by the police. State-
ments from the opposition camp fuelled 
fears that conflicts would break out after 
the elections. The Georgian Dream elec-
tion coalition, centred around Ivanishvili’s 
party (Georgian Dream − Democratic 
Georgia), criticised the president’s authori-
tarian leadership style and pledged an “end 
of the Saakashvili era”. Ivanishvili made 
his unexpected entrance onto the Georgian 
political stage in autumn 2011. Until then 
he had lived a secluded life, although his 
name was well known in connection with 
various charitable projects. He earned his 
fortune as an entrepreneur in Russia before 
returning to Georgia in 2002. Saakashvili’s 
party consequently did its best to paint 
him as a Kremlin stooge, and the president 
attempted to sideline his opponent by with-
drawing his Georgian citizenship. 
Realignments in political power 
Up until shortly before the elections, 
opinion polls were predicting a victory 
for the ruling government. However, they 
also showed that many voters were still 
undecided. A video released two weeks 
before the elections showing torture scenes 
in a prison also stirred up anti-government 
sentiment among the public. 
The elections on 1 October created sur-
prising realignments of political power in 
parliament and brought the opposition 
into government. Eighty-five of the 150 
parliamentary seats went to the Georgian 
Dream coalition. Of the six parties in the 
coalition, two others beside Ivanishvili’s 
party are significant: Our Georgia – Free 
Democrats led by the new Minister of 
Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Irakli 
Alasania, and the Republican Party of 
Georgia headed by David Usupashvili, the 
new chairman of the Georgian parliament. 
Both are advocates of democratic develop-
ment and reform. Then there are the other 
three parties, whose spectrum of ideology 
and policies range from entrepreneurial 
interests (Industry will Save Georgia) to 
nationalistic views (National Forum). How-
ever, the Georgian Dream parties still only 
have a weak footing in Georgian society 
and are barely institutionalised. This may 
threaten the coalition and make it difficult 
to consolidate the party system. Georgian 
Dream owes its election victory first and 
foremost to the popularity of the coalition 
leader and the social unrest caused by griev-
ances against the former government elite. 
The election results varied widely at 
the regional level, with the capital Tbilisi 
emerging as the stronghold of the opposi-
tion. With the exception of some regions 
like Ivanishvili’s home constituency, where 
93 percent of the vote went to Georgian 
Dream, people in rural areas in the Arme-
nian and Azerbaijani minority enclaves 
tended to vote for the ruling government 
party, although the results were not as deci-
sive as in previous elections. That is surpris-
ing given that Georgian Dream’s main criti-
cism of the previous government was that 
it had neglected the development of rural 
regions. 
Georgia in the transition phase 
With a solid majority in the new parlia-
ment, which moved its seat from Tbilisi to 
the country’s second largest city Kutaisi, 
Ivanishvili was able to secure the position 
of prime minister for himself and form a 
government. Although it is still the respon-
sibility of the president to appoint the 
prime minister, Saakashvili announced he 
would respect the electorate’s demand for 
a change of government. A constitutional 
amendment, passed in 2010, transferring 
executive powers from the president to the 
prime minister and the parliament, will 
only come into effect after the 2013 presi-
dential election. After two terms in office, 
Saakashvili will not be able to stand for 
re-election. Until then, however, he will 
still be the chief executive in a system that 
 SWP Comments 3 
January 2013 
3 
endows the president with great power. 
It remains to be seen how Saakashvili will 
cooperate with his rivals in the upper eche-
lons of government during the transition 
phase. 
The beginning of this phase has given 
cause for optimism. President Saakashvili 
conceded his party’s defeat on the day of 
the election. He said that although there 
were fundamental differences between 
the new and outgoing governments, he, as 
president and guarantor of the constitu-
tion, would ensure that the transition of 
power would be as civilised “as never before 
in Georgia’s history.” However, the decisive 
question is still whether the current presi-
dent is really prepared to give up the politi-
cal leadership of his country in 2013. If so, 
he would cut a striking contrast with the 
Putins, Lukashenkos, Karimovs and Nazar-
bayevs of other post-Soviet states. His rival 
Ivanishvili initially announced that he 
would only serve as prime minister for an 
intermediary period of 18 months. He later 
qualified this announcement by saying he 
would only leave the political arena when 
the change in government had been con-
solidated and he had fulfilled his election 
promises. Shortly after the elections and 
the formation of the new government, 
military and political officials from the 
defeated government were arrested for 
abuse of office. The subsequent disputes 
between the two camps suggest that the 
country’s political road ahead could well 
be rather bumpy. 
Cohabitation or power struggle? 
The new dual power constellation in 
Georgia is known as “cohabitation” – a 
term used to describe the relationship 
between a president and prime minister 
who belong to different political camps 
and both have executive powers. 
The change in government has not been 
quite as free of conflict as initially hoped, 
with some members of the previous govern-
ment hurriedly leaving their posts and even 
the country. The newly elected coalition 
announced its plans to set up a parliamen-
tary committee to investigate cases of abuse 
of office among the former government 
elite. Bacho Akhalaia, who served as prisons 
chief from 2005 to 2008 and subsequently 
as minister of defence, followed by a brief 
spell as minister of the interior, has been 
arrested on charges of mistreating soldiers, 
as have Giorgi Kalandadze, chief of joint 
staff of the Georgian armed forces, and 
another senior official. Other high-ranking 
civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior 
have also been charged with abuse of office. 
They are accused of taking “extralegal sur-
veillance measures” against Ivanishvili 
during the election campaign. in the latest 
edition of the annual report Freedom in the 
World 2013, released January 16, Georgia’s 
status was upgraded to “electoral democ-
racy”. Nevertheless, the report’s authors 
criticized the new government for prompt-
ly arresting some 30 officials of the pre-
vious government, which raised concerns 
about politically motivated prosecutions. 
These developments have put 
Saaskashvili on the defensive, even though, 
in addition to his wide-ranging powers, he 
(still) has a plentiful army of followers at 
the regional and local administrative levels. 
Prime Minister Ivanishvili meanwhile an-
nounced plans to accelerate the constitu-
tional changes curtailing the president’s 
powers and to ensure these came into effect 
before the next presidential election. On 
the ninth anniversary of the Rose Revolu-
tion on 23 November 2012, Saakashvili 
expressed his disapproval of the measures 
taken by the new government and com-
mented: “More and more people in Georgia 
realise that our country is in danger.” The 
New Year addresses given by the president 
and the prime minister demonstrated 
their sharply different standpoints and cast 
doubt on the ability of the two leaders to 
engage constructively in the cohabitation 
process.  
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New cabinet policy? 
President Saaskashvili’s staffing policy 
seemed aimed at creating a young and 
flexible cabinet. Ministers were hired and 
fired in quick succession. In the months 
leading up to the war with Russia in 2008, 
for example, no less than four different 
foreign ministers were appointed. Since 
2003, there have been eight changes in the 
leadership of the Ministry of Defence and 
of the armed forces. Some of Saakashvili’s 
followers had held several ministerial posts 
by the time they reached their mid-thirties. 
Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s cabinet 
policy seems to be more focused on con-
tinuity and professionalism. This includes 
appointing officials who held government 
posts before the Rose Revolution. One of 
the experienced, yet relatively young offi-
cials in the new government is Minister of 
Defence Irakli Alasania, who worked with-
in the security forces prior to 2003. Under 
Saakashvili, he was initially involved in 
mediating the conflict with Abkhazia and 
later sent to New York as Georgia’s UN 
ambassador. In 2008 he distanced himself 
from the ruling elite and criticised Saakash-
vili for his policies towards breakaway 
regions of the country. After almost ten 
years at the European Court of Human 
Rights, 37-year-old lawyer Tea Tsulukiani 
took up the post of minister of justice. How-
ever, there are also newcomers in Ivanish-
vili’s cabinet. Just turned 30, lawyer Irakli 
Garibashvili is a loyal follower of Ivanish-
vili’s and has worked closely with the bil-
lionaire for the past eight years, helping 
him to run his bank and charitable foun-
dation. He will now head the Ministry of 
the Interior. Another Cartu Bank employee 
has been appointed minister of economic 
affairs. One of the most surprising political 
newcomers is football star Kakha Kaladze, 
who was originally considered for the post 
of regional development minister but was 
later appointed energy minister. 
Emphases in domestic policy 
The new coalition government wants to 
make further changes to the constitution 
to move the country towards a parliamen-
tary system. However, it is 15 parliamentary 
seats short of the majority needed to make 
constitutional amendments. Defections 
from the previous governing party to the 
new one could create the necessary major-
ity. Beginning in 2004, the former govern-
ing party, now in opposition, and Presi-
dent Saaskashvili introduced reforms in 
administration, public services (which bare-
ly existed until then), the police and in the 
fight against crime and corruption. These 
are acknowledged even by their critics. The 
accusations directed at the previous govern-
ment concerned the way it repressed those 
with unwelcome political views, its attacks 
on the business community, the precarious 
state of the prison system and other prob-
lems, which the president and his interior 
and justice ministers in particular are held 
responsible for. The ranks of the current 
parliamentary majority and the new gov-
ernment contain many of Saakashvili’s 
former allies, who joined the opposition 
out of disappointment at these develop-
ments. 
To date, the powerful Ministry of the 
Interior has controlled the majority of the 
country’s security forces. From 2004, it was 
headed by Vano Merabishvili, a key figure 
in Saakashvili’s power structure. In a time 
of rapidly changing faces in government 
ministries he served as a symbol of con-
tinuity. However, he also personified an 
atmosphere in which the president and his 
party’s monopoly on power was sustained 
by force. The new interior minister, Gari-
bashvili, has promised to “depoliticise” the 
ministry, and, in particular, to protect legal 
bodies from political meddling. The Minis-
try of the Interior is due to be entirely 
restructured and will be comprised of only 
two main departments in future: the police 
and the borders agency. Garibashvili has 
also promised to continue the previous gov-
ernment’s success in fighting crime. This 
success has also had grave consequences, 
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however. Prisoner numbers have shot 
up from just over 6,000 in 2003 to 24,000 
today, and conditions in prisons were the 
main reason for claims of human rights 
violations by the Georgian ombudsman and 
international organisations. A video show-
ing torture scenes in Gldani prison no. 8 in 
Tbilisi led to protests in the capital. Presi-
dent Saakashvili conceded fundamental 
problems in the prisons system after the 
video was released at a tactical point in 
the election campaign.  
In 2006, the European Union listed 
judicial reform and the independence of 
the judiciary as its top priorities in its 
action plan for Georgia. Follow-up reports 
in the following years praised the reforms 
in the training of judges, but found that 
the courts could still not be regarded as 
independent from the executive. In this 
respect, a report said, Georgia has not suf-
ficiently distinguished itself from neigh-
bouring Russia, even though it is allegedly 
so keen to set itself apart from this country 
through its democratic and constitutional 
reforms. By appointing Tea Tsulukiani as 
minister of justice the new government has 
shown it is making human rights a policy 
priority. The arrests of former government 
members on charges of abusing their office 
are currently playing a central role in shap-
ing opinion on the latest developments in 
the country’s justice system. Tsulukiani and 
Ivanishvili both stressed “the primacy of 
the law” in their statements on the arrests 
and refuted the opposition’s claim that 
they were using the chance to exact re-
venge on their political opponents. Voices 
outside the country, including the NATO 
Secretary General, emphasised the impor-
tance of transparency and the rule of law 
in the ongoing criminal proceedings, and 
warned against any kind of politically 
motivated “selective justice”. In his New 
Year message, Prime Minister Ivanishvili 
identified the “establishment of rule of law 
which is replacing political persecutions 
and selective application of justice” as the 
main challenge to Georgia’s political trans-
formation after the power change.  
In the field of economic policy, the main 
criticism levelled at the former govern-
ment by the opposition and large sections 
of the population was that it had largely 
disregarded the social dimension of the 
reforms so highly praised by international 
financial organisations. Pre-election opin-
ion polls revealed voters’ three main con-
cerns to be the country’s high unemploy-
ment levels, the prohibitive cost of health-
care for most Georgians, and agriculture, 
which had been neglected in the Rose 
Revolution’s reform agenda. Even though 
it makes up a mere eight percent of Geor-
gia’s economic output, more than half the 
population are employed in this sector, 
mostly in some form of subsistence farm-
ing. The Rose Revolution did not therefore 
lay out a bed of roses for most Georgians. It 
was only in 2012 that the previous govern-
ment decided to allocate more resources 
to social programmes, and invest in health 
insurance and the development of rural 
regions. Since poverty reduction measures 
had largely fallen by the wayside in the 
past, billionaire Ivanishvili’s long record of 
charitable work has raised high expecta-
tions. A phenomenon can be seen here that 
Georgia has experienced repeatedly since 
its independence: In view of the harsh reali-
ties of Georgian life, political leaders like 
presidents Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze 
and Saakashvili all began their time in 
office being hailed as a kind of messiah and 
bringer of hope. The new messiah is called 
Ivanishvili and he has a private fortune 
equivalent to half of Georgia’s GDP and, 
in arithmetical terms, the government’s 
entire budget. When Georgian Dream were 
elected, it was not clear to what extent the 
state budget and the coalition leader’s 
private fortune would be used to fulfil that 
dream. The former governing party, now in 
opposition, claims that Ivanishvili did not 
adequately specify how the promised new 
social services would be financed. 
 SWP Comments 3 
January 2013 
6 
Conflicts and foreign policy – 
a new beginning? 
The new coalition’s objectives in foreign 
policy and in the conflicts with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are also markedly dif-
ferent to those pursued by the previous 
government. Here too, cabinet choices 
reflect a significant shift in substance and 
priorities. However, it immediately became 
apparent that there is a very deep divide on 
these issues both between the government 
and the opposition, and within the ruling 
coalition. The government therefore has 
little room to manoeuvre in both these 
policy areas. 
Perhaps the most revolutionary appoint-
ment in the new government was that of 
Paata Zakareishvili of the Republican Party 
as state minister for reintegration. Zaka-
reishvili was one of the most prominent 
critics of the policy of Saakashvili’s United 
National Movement towards Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Over the last 15 years he was 
a civil society representative involved in 
numerous civil society dialogue processes 
coordinated by western non-governmental 
organisations, including the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation and Berghof Conflict Research. 
He has excellent contacts and is exception-
ally well regarded in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
For these reasons and because Zakareish-
vili’s views differ so drastically from the 
previous government’s policy, his appoint-
ment signalled a clear change of direction 
and raised great hopes in Tbilisi and also 
in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, the capitals of 
the breakaway regions. 
The Saakashvili administration had 
taken a two-pronged approach to inter-
nationalising the conflicts from a very early 
stage. First, it sought to more actively en-
gage the US and the EU in the existing con-
flict resolution mechanisms, in order to 
reinforce Georgia’s position towards Russia. 
Second, it identified Russia as its main ad-
versary in the conflicts. As a consequence, 
a resolution of the conflicts was considered 
possible only at the level of Georgian-
Russian relations. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, 
on the other hand, were regarded as Mos-
cow’s puppets without a political role to 
play. This approach had become official 
policy by the time of the Russo-Georgian 
war of 2008 at the latest, and in 2009 and 
2010 was enshrined in the Law on Occupied 
Territories and the State Strategy on Occu-
pied Territories: Engagement Through Co-
operation. 
In recent years, voices calling for confi-
dence-building measures and direct inter-
action with societal actors and the de-
facto governments in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia had largely been marginalised 
and vilified. Zakareishvili and his (few) 
like-minded companions denounced the 
government for what they regarded as a 
nationalistic and confrontational policy 
prior to the 2008 war and the restrictive 
measures subsequently enforced. In their 
view, the State Strategy on Occupied Ter-
ritories was merely intended to appease 
Georgia’s western allies and was not moti-
vated by a genuine desire to resolve the 
problem together with the other parties to 
the conflicts. 
The new minister’s first statements did 
indeed point to a radical change of strategy 
and direction. He announced a de-isolation 
strategy, which would pave the way for 
social, economic and political contact with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. His first specif-
ic proposals were to rename the ministry 
(and delete the word “reintegration”, which 
had been so heavily criticised by Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia), to reopen the Russo-
Georgian railway line through Abkhazia, 
and to recognise Abkhaz and South Osse-
tian identification documents for travel 
within Georgia. Zakareishvili, who em-
phasised that these would be unilateral 
steps undertaken by Georgia, thus sought 
to counterbalance the rhetoric and policies 
of the Saaskashvili era and create a new 
basis for building trust. 
However, it soon became clear just 
how difficult it would be to implement 
these ideas. The government is presenting 
a divided picture. While Zakareishvili’s 
initial statements indicated a departure 
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from the line taken by Saakashvili, other 
government representatives were still 
plainly using the latter’s rhetoric. The state 
minister was forced to publicly endorse the 
existing documents (the Law on Occupied 
Territories and the State Strategy for Re-
integration) and confirm that these would 
only be amended following an in-depth 
review. The debate on the name of the 
ministry has also proved thorny and con-
troversial. The government has found it 
difficult to present a united front on other 
key issues too, such as an agreement on 
the non-use of force being demanded by 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and Russia). 
All this is damaging Zakareishvili’s credi-
bility. The cautiously optimistic reaction 
to his appointment in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia has meanwhile turned to bitter 
criticism. 
This internal wrangling, compounded by 
attacks from the opposition, show just how 
little scope Zakareishvili has for achieving 
his aims. If he is not able to establish cross-
government consensus soon, he will not be 
in a position to make Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia any serious offers. The already slim 
chances of creating a more constructive 
approach to the conflicts could soon evap-
orate. 
In foreign policy, the new government 
is seeking to combine its strategy of Euro-
Atlantic integration with the aim of im-
proving relations with Moscow. The focus 
on normalising economic and social rela-
tions with Russia might prove a smart 
move, as could the appointment of a special 
envoy on relations with Russia. This could 
lead to a division of labour in which the 
Foreign Ministry promotes partnership 
with the US, Nato and the EU, while Special 
Envoy Zurab Abashidze pragmatically 
works on improving relations with Russia. 
However, Georgia’s state representatives are 
not all towing the same line on this issue 
either. Officially, foreign policy is still the 
preserve of the president. Saakashvili has 
been using it to strengthen his position 
both within and outside Georgia. After the 
elections, many embassies continued to 
take the position of the old rather than the 
new government, and ambassadors are still 
appointed by the president. This could lead 
to new conflicts in the coming months; for 
example, when it comes to appointing a 
new ambassador for the all-important em-
bassy in Washington. 
Russia has reacted cautiously to the new 
political landscape in Georgia. Some sug-
gestions, especially the opening of the rail-
way line between the two countries, which 
is in Moscow’s interest, could indeed bring 
new momentum to Russo-Georgian rela-
tions. However, there are still difficult 
obstacles ahead. There are no signs that 
Moscow and Tbilisi will come to an agree-
ment on their greatest point of contention: 
Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and the presence of Russian troops 
there. The close connection between these 
two issues and Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia’s mistrust of a potential rapprochement 
between Russia and Georgia also entail the 
risk of triggering further destabilisation 
should the new government fail in its con-
flict resolution policy. A first meeting 
between Russian and Georgian envoys took 
place on the margins of the latest round of 
the Geneva Discussions in December, but 
relations remain fragile and the outcome 
unpredictable. 
Conclusions 
The Georgian population has effected a 
change in government by means of a demo-
cratic election. If the transition period 
passes smoothly, this will mark a unique 
achievement in the former Soviet Union 
area. The presence of a strong opposition 
in parliament also gives reason to hope that 
the democratic process will progress. How-
ever, to make the most of this potential, all 
the country’s political actors will have to 
play by the rules. If not, the situation could 
soon spiral out of control, as it did in the 
final years of the Saakashvili administra-
tion. 
In some areas, like fighting corruption 
and Euro-Atlantic integration, the new gov-
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ernment will continue the work of its 
predecessor. In others, like agricultural 
policy, economic policy, social policy, con-
flicts and Russian relations, it will strike 
out in a new direction and may even suc-
ceed in correcting some of the mistakes of 
the past few years. That said, the govern-
ment lacks cohesion and the exact dis-
tribution of power will remain unclear 
until after the presidential elections in 
2013. This creates uncertainty and could 
tempt both sides to manipulate the am-
biguous situation to their own advantage. 
Germany and the EU should act as 
critical yet supportive partners to Georgia 
during this complex phase. Within the con-
text of bilateral relations and the Eastern 
Partnership, they should aim to boost the 
reform process and draw attention to any 
worrying tendencies. A clear statement 
recognising the new government would 
help it consolidate its domestic position. 
This particularly applies to the govern-
ment’s conflict policy, which could now 
shift significantly closer to the European 
non-recognition and engagement policy 
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the 
new coalition succeeds in improving rela-
tions between Georgia and Russia, while 
preserving its close relations with the EU 
and the US, it will have taken a major step 
towards stabilising this volatile region. Ger-
many can play an important supporting 
role here. 
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